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r
The possibility of private financing and operation of the Space
Operations Center (SOC) is considered as an alternative to SOC development
by the government. A hypothetical revenue model for SOC services is
constructed and is compared wi.^ :h NASA estimates of SOC development and
operating costs. A present-value analysis based on a 1985-2000 investment
horizon shows a potential for substantial profit in a private SOC venture,
although the possibility of large losses is not discounted. Present-value
estimates range from $8.6 billion down to a low of minus $3.3 billion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of establishing a permanently-manned space station
in Earth-orbit is not a new one. Scientific work on this subject
dates back to the early 1900x, and studies have identified many
possible de3ign configurations for such a facility. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recently formed an
office to study the multi-purpose Space Operations Center (SOC),
which now appears to be a likely candidate for a manned U.S.
space station.
Early studies of the economics of the SOC have raised an
interesting question: could a facility such as the SOC be built
and operated for profit by a private organization? Government
ail industry are likely to find this question increasingly
relevant as man's role in space expands. As the
commercialization of space comm^inications is followed by the
opening up of markets for space processing, space energy systems,
and space habitation, the opportunities for profitable endeavors
in space will multiply. A space operations base would play a
pivotal role in this entire industrialization process, and
private ownership of a space station would be consistent with
American ideals and historical precedent. As this paper will
point out, such an enterprise might also be financially
attractive.
II. THE SOC MISSION MODEL
The major obstacles to the private financing of a SOC are
similar to those for other proposed space projects: a large
up-front investment, long lead-time, and high risk. Unlike
programs such as the satellite power system, however, the SOC
would provide a wide variety of basic services, most of which are
essential for the realization of widely-accepted near-term space
goals. The versatility of the SOC would guarantee an active
market for SOC services, and would help to insure financial
success in such operations.
By the early 1990s a SOC could be involved in dozens of
independent space operations. These can be divided into three
categories: basic operations, military operations, and
specialized operations. Basic operations are those whose
profitability are easiest to predict, and which would be most
likely to provide economic stability during the critical early
years of SOC operations. Basic operations consist of launch
services (from low-Earth to yeosynchronous orbit) for
communications satellites, and space science services. Military
operations are potentially as valuable as basic operations, but
cannot be assessed without the involvement of high-level defense
authorities. Military operations could include the launch,
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storage, repair, and protection of military satellites, Earth and
space observations, and possibly even space construction.
Whether the military would be willing to have these services
provided by a private organization is questionable, but such
cooperation between the military and industry would not be
unprecedented. Finally, specialized SOC operations would offer
the potential for the long-term growth of SOC activities,
although the ;;OC could be involved in such functions by the early
1990s. Specialized operations include launch services for
non-communications payloads, satellite servicing, and, most
importantly, materials processing in space (MPS). MPS alone
could provide several billion dollars of'SOC revenue annually by
the end of this century. Other specialized operations such as
space construction and the processing of non-terrestrial
materials are also compatible with, if not dependent upon a SOC,
but will not be considered in this financial assessment.
TII. BASIC OPERATIONS
One of the major functions of a Space Operation Center would
be the delivery of communications satellites to geosynchronous
orbit. The SOC would be located in low Earth-orbit (LEO), within
range of the Space Shuttle. Communications satellites could be
launched from Earth via the Shuttle, and then transferred at the
SOC to reusable, chemical-propulsion orbital transfer vehicles
(OTVs). The OTVs would have a payload capacity of about 12,000
pounds, and could deliver as many as four satellites at a time to
geosynchronous orbit. It is likely that two OTVs could be
berthed at the SOC at all times.
The profitability of launching communications satellites via
the SOC would depend upon a number , of factors. These include,
primarily, the demand for space communications and the cost of
operating the SOC OTVs. Since we have had considerable
experience with space communications and various types of launch
vehicles, it is not impossible to evaluate these conditions.
Demand for the launch of communications satellites is expected to
increase dramatically by the 1990s, with over 150 communications
satellites expected to be in orbit by the year 2000. Many of
these satellites will be very large in comparison with today's
..ommunications satellites, and the SOC would be particularly
valuable for the launch of these large payloads. Table 1 shows
projections of the demand for launches of various sizes of
communications satellites over the next twenty years. To support
this level of traffic, approximately 100 OTV flights would be
required during the 1990s. (ref. 1) .
The costs of utilizing SOC (or space-based) OTVs for delivery
of these satellites can be broken down into three components:
development costs, unit costs,and operating costs. Development
costs (DDT& E) for SOC launch services consist of the cost of
developing the OTV launch system, which can be estimated at about
$1 billion. The unit cost (cost per QTV) could range from $35
million to $110 million per vehicle. Operating costs include the
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cost of periodically refurbishing the OTVs (estimated at $20
million to $50 million every ten flights, plus $50 million for
transportation of the OTV to Earth and back to the SOC each
time), the cost of delivering communications payloads to the SOC
via the Shuttle ($12 million per OTV flight), and, most
importantly, the cost of delivering fuel for the OTVs to the SOC
(about $42 million per OTV mission). These costs are summarized
in Table 2; the high cost estimates have been used for
conservatism. The total cost per OTV flight, including
amortization of development costs, is slightly over $91 million.
(ref.  2) .
The best way to estimate the profitability of SOC
communications launch services is to compare the cost of
utilizing the space-based OTVs with other possible launch
methods. The cost "savings," or the difference between the cost
of using the SOC OTVs and of the other launch vehicles,
represents an upper bound on the profitability of the SOC launch
system. The SOC OTVs could be compared with today's expendable
launch vehicles (Delta,?
 Titan, etc.), but since the expendables
are almost certain to be obsolete by the 1990s, this would not be
a valid comparison. One exception might be Europe's Ariane
expendable launch vehicle, which is expected to provide NASA's
Space Transportation System with stiff competition for launch
services for certain types of payloads. When relable data about
the costs and capabilities of Arl,ane's future syatems (Ariane II,
III, and IV) become available, it could influence the results of
this assessment.
Another possibility is to compare SOC OTV costs with the
expected costs of the Shuttle upper-stage boosters, the SSUS-D,
SSUS-A, and IUS. The upper-stage costs are shown in Table 3.
When compared with the SSUS and IUS, the space-based OTV shows a
dramatic cost advantage, with average annual savings of over $500
million during the 1990s. Figure 1 shows OTV savings as a
function of the demand for the launch of communications
satellites. Even if demand varies from current projections, the
space-based OTV is likely to have a significant cost advantage
over the Shuttle upper-stages.
However, the Shuttle upper-stages may also be obsolete by the
1990s, even though they have never been used to date. If the
upper-stages were the only alternative to the SOC OTVs, a company
operating a SOC could conceivably earn annual profits of close to
a half a billion dollars on communications satellite launch
services. It is not difficult, however, to envision other launch
systems capable of competing with the SOC OTVs. The closest
competitor appears to be a single-stage Earth-based OTV, which
would be launched directly from the Space Shuttle and which would
resemble the proposed Shuttle-Centaur launch system. It too
would be likely to have tremendous cost advantages over the
Shuttle upper-stages, as illustrated in Table 4. (Table 4 also
includes data on a 2-stage Earth-based OTV system which would not
depend upon the Space Shuttle. This system is not competitive
with the other options.)
Given optimistic cost-estimates for the single-stage
Earth-based system (a worst-case condition for the SOC, again a
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conservative assumptic,^1 1l , the profit potential of the space-based
OTV system is reduced from over $500 million per year to under
$80 million.	 Figure 2 summarizes the cost savings (i.e. maximum
profit potential) of the space-based OTV in comparison with the
Shuttle upper-stages and the Earth-based OTV. Figure 2 also
illustrates the significance of the propellant delivery costs to
the SOC. If the cost of delivering fuel to low Earth-orbit could
be reduced from $42 million to some lower cost, the SOC OTVs
would look much more attractive, For example, if 80 tons of
propellant could be delivered to the SOC for "free" each year by
draining excess fuel from Shuttle external tanks, or by using
liquid oxygen as "ballast" in the Orbiter cargo bay, then the
profitability of the SOC OTV system could be increased by a
factor of three. Another possibility shown in Figure 2 is
delivery of OTV fuel to the SOC by a heavy-lift launch vehicle
(HLLV), a Shuttle-derived "tanker" which reduces lift costs from
Earth by about 600. This would provide an even greater cost
advantage than the Shuttle fuel "scavenging" scenario. A more
ambitious alternative is to process liquid oxygen from lunar ore,
which could reduce propellant delivery costs to $5 million per
OTV flight or less. Since this is a highly speculative option it
is not included in this analysis, but it is conceivable that SOC
launch operations could provide sufficient economic justification
for the establishment of a lunar mining operation aimed at liquid
oxygen production.
Using the SOC as a base for the launch of communications
satellites could generate annual profits of $80 million to $290
million or more by the 1990s. Although other SOC operations
would ultimately be expected to have even greater profit
potential, the SOC OTVs could provide financial stability and a
guaranteed income as the other SOC operations develop. Another
basic operation which could be presumed to have profit potential
during early SOC operations is space science services. The SOC
could play a vital role in the advancement of scientific research
in space, particularly in the area of life sciences.
Unfortunately, much of the SOC's value to space science is
qualitative, and is difficult to evaluate. For example, how much
will it be worth to have the ability to conduct long-duration
studies of living systems on the SOC? How is this value
translated into SOC profit potential? These questions are
further complicated by the fact that the government would
probably be a major consumer of SOC space science services.
We can, however, develop a simplified model of SOC space
science operations, and obtain a rough preliminary estimate of
the dollar value of such services. Consider, for example, the
option of making the European Spacelab a permanent element of the
SOC design. Aside from increasing the maximum duration for
Spacelab missions from one week to several months or years (a
tremendous benefit in itself), this set-up wculd have an obvious
economic advantages the Spacelab module would not have to be
launched into space more than once, saving tens of millions of
dollars in transportation costs on Spacelab missions every year.
A SOC-Spacelab mission would require the launch only of
_10
experiment racks and support personnel, which would require at
most one-third of a Shuttle flight. Integrating the experiment
racks into the Spacelab in space would be more complex than doing
so on the ground, but would cost only a tiny fraction of the $36
million which would be saved on every Spacelab mission by freeing
two-thirds of a Shuttle flight. Assuming 4-8 Spacelab missions
per year during the 1990s, savings on Spacelab transportaion
costs could range from $144 million to $288 million per year.
In addition to transportation, there could be large savings
on drily SOC-Spacelab operations. The cost of operating the
Spacelab at the SOC would entail a relatively small marginal
increase in basis SOC operating costs, and could therefore cost
$200,000 to $500,000 per day less than operating the Spacelab in
the Shuttle cargo bay. If it is assumed that the Spacelab would
be in use at the SOC for at least 2 to 4 months per year, then
total savings on Spacelab transportation and operations could
range from $160 million to $350 m.tllion per year. Using the SOC
as a permanent base for the Spacelab would also represent a far
more efficient utilization of the Space Transportation System
than if the Shuttle had to be used for every day of Spacelab
operations.
Many space science experiments will also have the potential
to lead to commercial applications of space ', ­:?hnology. The
SOC-Spacelab would have an advantage over tlr,,4 -huttle-Spacelab in
its provision of facilities for expansion to r.ommercial-scale
space operations. For example, materials processing in space
experiments during the 1990s are likely to result in the
discovery of pharmaceuticals, electronics materials, and other
products for which zero-gravity space processing would be
economically advantageous. The SOC would have the space, energy,
manpower, and mission duration capabilities for commercial-scale
processing of many products that the Shuttle would not be able to
provide. The SOC would also serve as a base for space
construction,, and could ultimately evolve into a full-scale
"space factory." Revenue from basic operations would not be
dependent upon such long-term developments, but the basic
operations could eventually lead to a SOC monopoly of space
manufacturing capabilities, which could be of enormous value.
IV. MILITARY OPERATIONS
During the 1990s and beyond, military uses of space are
likely to expand as rapidly, if not faster, than civilian space
applications. It is almost certain that a manned station in low
`	 Earth-orbit such as the SOC would be valuable, if not essential,
for national defense. This could turn out to be a positive
influence on the commercial viaUility of a SOC venture, but the
financial picture of SOC military operations needs much
clarification. Assuming that the military would be .Interested in
using a privately-operated space station, it is still very
difficult to assess the value of such operations to the SOC
ownership. This is primarily because of the secrecy involved in
-11-
the planning of future military space activities.
Launch of military payloads to geosynchronous orbit is a
possible SOC service which could rival the launch of civilian
communications satellites in financial importance. The
Department of Defense (DOD) could also be presumed to have an
interest in various types of space science activities,
particularly those involving human beings in space for extended
periods. Various reports have indicated that the military also
has a profound interest in a manned "battle station" in space.
(ref. 3) . Its functions would include storage, servicing, and
protection of military satellites; construction of large space
systems such as power systems, particle-beam weapons, and energy
shields; and manned coordination of military space activities.
For these reasons it could be assumed that SOC revenue from
military space operations could be as great as revenue from SOC
basic operations, but for the purposes of this analysis it is
also assumed that military SOC applications could be
non-existent.
Even if the military were not willing or able to use a
private SOC, however, its interest in space could indirectly help
to make development of a private space station possible. The
military could, for example, develop its own space station, and
subsequently make the results of its DDT&E work available to the
private sector. This would greatly reduce the cost of building a
separate private space station, since as much as 951 of the cost
of a facility such as the SOC would fall into the general
category of research and development. One way in which the
military and the private sector could share SOC costs would be
for the DOD to pay a firm to design and develop a military space
station, and for the firm to then build its own space station on
the basis of the same R&D work. The second, commercial space
station could perhaps be financed from profits made on
development o! the first (DOD) space facility. A private
organization with an interest in establishing a SOC could pursue
negotiations with military officials to assesss the possible role
of the DOD in such cooperative activities. A financial picture
of the SOC would be incomplete without thorough consideration of
such alternatives.
V. SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS
Whereas basic operations and perhaps also military operations
could provide a reliable source of income during the early years
of SOC activity, there is a much broader range of specialized
operations upon which the financial prospects of the SOC would
ultimately depend. These specialized operations would make the
SOC not only a focal point for space communications activities,
but also for the development of space processing, space energy
systems, and, in the long term, space habitation. It requires a
bit of imagination to envision all of these as thrivI ng
industries, but the same was true of the now explosive space
communications industry two decades ago. Not only would the SOC
-12-
h.ve .pplic.tion. in .11 of th •• e field., but it could ind.ed b • 
• bsolutely •••• nti.l for the d.v.lop..nt of th ••• indu.tri ••• 
Th. own.r. of • SOC would h.v. gr •• t influ.nc. ov.r the 
d.v.lop..nt of th ••• indu.tri •• , •• well •• the fin.nci.l 
benefit. which could b. re.lized through .uch pione.ring 
.nde.vors. 
A •• p.c •• ctiviti •• continue to .xp.nd, de •• nd for ••• orted 
l.unch .ervice •• hould incr..... In .ddition to the b •• lc 
oper.tion of l.unching co •• unic.tion ••• t.llite., • soc could be 
involv.d in the tr.n.fer of. non-communic.tion. p.ylo.d. to higher 
orbit.. The.e could includ. r.mot.-son.ing .nd oth.r .ci.nce .nd 
.pplic.tions p.ylo.ds, •• well •• exp.rim.nt.l .tructure., .uch 
.s prototype •• tellit. pow.r .y.t.... Ther. would prob.bly be • 
rel.tively ••• 11 number of .uch p.yl~.ds, .ince low-Earth orbit 
would .uffice in .any c •••• , but non-com.unication. paylo.d. 
could probably increa •• u.ag. of :~OC OTVS by 5-10' over that 
required for co •• unic.tion~ .atellite l.unch .ervic... Thi. 
could repre.ent an additional $4 .illlon to $28 million per year 
in SOC profits. 
Sat.llite serviCing is another speci.lized SOC op.ration with 
a m.asurabl. profit potential. Despit. the fact that 
com.unications satellites h.ve rel.tiv.ly short op.rating liv.s (8-10 y.ars), r~pairing, refurbi.hing, and upgrading th ••• 
• atellit.s in ~pac. could b.com. an i.portant SOC function. 
Estimat.s of the value of .uch s.rvic.s run as high as 40' of the 
total value of the sat.llit •• erviced, which i. fr.qu.ntly in the 
t.ns of millions of dollars_ Assuming a rath.r con.ftrvativ. 
profit of $2 million to $5 million per sat.llit. s.rvic.d on ten 
to twenty .uch jobs per y.ar, the SOC profit pot.ntial from 
.atellite servicing can be calculated at $20 million to $100 
million per year. 
The .ost importlu~t specialized operation for a Space 
Op.rations C.nt.r, howev.r, would almost certainly b •• aterials 
processing in space. The profit pot.ntial fro. space proc.ssing 
during the 1990s and b.yond is .normous, and, unlike other SOC 
operations, MPS has virtually unli.ited growth potential. 
Unofficial industry projectlon. of the gross annual sal.s of 
space-proc.ss.d .at.rial. range as high as $50 billion by the end 
of this c.ntury. It can be s.fely .tat.d that MPS is lik.ly to 
b. a key to the financial .ucce.s of any SOC ventur •• 
. Unfortunately, it i. i.po •• ible to verify estimate. of the 
value of .pace processing_ w. are only beginning to und.r.tand 
the effects of zero-gravity on mat.rials, and years of exp.nsive 
r •• earch will be r.quited b.fore co •• eroially viable .pace 
processing operations can b. id.ntified. NASA and industry have 
identified certain type. of pharmaceutical products .nd 
.lectronic. material. which .ay b. sig~\ificantly cheaper to 
produc. in .pace than on Earth, and it i. widely agre.d that 
spac. proc ••• ing will eventu~lly b.co •• a thriving i~dustry. But 
nobody knows exactly how or when. 
A •• all f.umber of co.pani •• have inve.t.d signi ficant 
resource. in MPS re.earch, and some .... '(pact to begin comm.rc ial 
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space processing activities within this decade. Because of the
high stakes involved, however, firms engaged in MPS are generally
reluctant to publicize the results of their scientific and
marketing research. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. (MDAC) has probably
done the most to demonstrate the profit potential of space
processing, but much of the company's work is shrouded in
proprietary secrecy. MDAC has teamed with Johnson a Johnson to
produce pharmaceuticals in space, and will begin flying
experiments on the Space Shuttle as early as the summer of 1982.
To date, tens of millions of dollars have been committed to this
project by these two companies and by NASA (with whom a
Joint-Endeavor Agreement has been signed), but it will still be
several years before the commercial viability of these space
processing operations can be proven. It may very well be worth
the wait; annual sales of pharmaceutical products which are
strong candidates for space processing are in the billions of
dollars, and it can be safely assumed that MDAC is aiming for a
significant share of this market.
Similarly, there are a number of electronics materials which
have strong MPS potential. Space-processing of high-purity
gallium-arsenide (GaAs) could revolutionize the electronics
industry, and could generate a lively market for the product at
several hundred thousand dollars per pound. in addition to
pharmaceuticals and electronics materials, perfected glass
products and exotic alloys might also be produced in space with
results which could not be achieved on Earth, and at great
profit.
There are few if any published estimates of the potential
sales of space-manufactured products, but a survey of experts
involved in MPS research would yield estimates of gross annual
sales of space products in the range of $200 million (in 1990) to
$50 billion (in 2000). This broad range of estimates illustrates
the great degree of uncertainty with regard to the future of
commercial MPS, but also demonstrates clearly a high level of
confidence in the potential of space processing. For the
purposes of this analysis this range can be narrowed to a more or
less conservative $1 billion to $6 billion in gross annual sales
as a 1990s average. If 20% of MPS sales could be allocated as
"rent" to the SOC, then the SOC revenue potential from space
processing would be in the range of $200 million to $1.2 billion
per year by the mid-1990x.
Despite the uncertainties involved, it is evident that MPS
could become the single most profitable SOC operation by the end
of the 1990x. With continued growth in commercial space
processing applications, the Space Operations Center could
ultimately evolve primarily into a space factory, regularly
shipping a wide variety of important medical and industrial
products to Earth. Ground-based MPS research and small Shuttle
experiments over the next several years should help to resolve
the uncertainties involved in commercial space processing, and
should also help to clarify the SOC financial picture.
-14-
VI. SOC REVENUE SUMMARY
The revenue projections for SOC operations are summarized in
Table 5. Many possible SOC operations, such as space
construction, are not included because of the difficulties
involved in evaluating their profit potential. Those figures
which are listed, however, are certainly open to debate as well.
Many assumptions went into the formulation of those estimates,
some of which are presented in Table 6, the SOC sensitivity
analysis. Here the impact of a 50% chhnge in the assumed or
mid-range values of SOC operations and underlying assumptions are
listed. For example, a 50• change in the mid-range value of
military operations ($315 million/year) results in a lot change
in SOC revenue. Similarly, a 50• change in the assumed demand
for communications satellite launches (estimated to require 100
OTV flights from 1990 to 2000) causes a 6• change in SOC total
revenue. The value of the sensitivity analysis is that it shows
which SOC operations are most important to study in order to
develop a more firm financial assessment of a SOC enterprise.
VII. SOC COSTS
Determining the cost of a Space Operations Center, although a
formidable task in itself, is somewhat less risky than attempting
to predict the profitability of SOC operations. Experience with
Skylab, Spacelab, and previous generations of launch vehicles has
provided a basic understanding of the major costs involved in the
development and utilization of orbital space facilities, and the
level of costs associated with the SOC would probably not be out
of line with that of other large projects of the past. In fact,
the SOC would probably cost only a small fraction of what Project
Apollo cost (10-20%, at most), and less than half of what NASA
has already invested in the Space Shuttle.
NASA is currently sponsoring in-depth studies of SOC costs,
but fairly detailed first-order estimates have already been
achieved. For a full "growth" SOC capable of the types of
operations described in this paper, total development and
production costs have been estimated at between $5 billion and $7
billion, with the actual hardware production costs accounting for
only about $1 billion of this total. The major contributors to
SOC costs are DDT&.E for the SOC habitat and service modules,
systems testing and evaluation, and program support, which
together comprise about half of the total. These cost estimates,
however, are based on the assumption that NASA will be the
builder and operator of the SOC. If the SOC were built by a
private company, a total cost reduction of about one-third would
not be an unreasonable expectation. Possibilities also exist for
the redv-tion of SOC costs through simplification of the SOC
design and utilization of existing hardware. A SOC fabricated
from the Shuttle's external fuel tanks, for-example 
F 
4could
greatly reduce the costs of the expensive habitat ad service
modules. Such possibilities need to be investigated thoroughly
-15-
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before a committment is made to full development of any
particular SOC design.
In addition to development and production costs, there would
be basic costs involved in the support of the SOC crew and
operations. A very rough estimate of these SOC operating costs
is $400 million to $1 billion per year, which corresponds to
approximately $1 million to $3 million per day. These costs
would obviously increase with the expansion of SOC activities,
but for the operations described in this paper over the given
time period (1990-2000), it is unlikely that baseline operating
costs would exceed $1 billion per year. It should be emphasized,
however, that these figures do not include variable costs
associated with particular SOC operations, such as OTV costs
(previously estimated at about $81 million per OTV flight) and
the costs associated with changing Spacelab equipment and
personnel ($20 million minimum per mission). These variable
costs, however, are accounted for in the SOC revenue model;
revenue from communications satellite launch services, for
example, is calculated as the net difference between the variable
cost associated with operation of the SOC OTVs, and the cost of
launching communications payloads with other systems (e.g.
Shuttle upper-stage boosters).
VIII. SOC PRESENT-VALUE ANALYSIS
One method which can be used to evaluate the attractiveness
of the SOC as a private business venture is to perform a
discounted present-value analysis. Figure 3 shows a "worst-case"
present-value assessment for private SOC financing. Through a
combination of tax credits, design modifications, and
private-sector efficiency the actual undiscounted investment
required is reduced from the estimated $5-7 billion required for
the NASA SOC (ref. 4) to $4 billion. This is not an overly
optimistic assumption. The analysis also assumes a real discount
rate of 10%. a pessimistic assumption, and covers a five-year
development period and the first decade of SOC operations. Based
on the SOC revenue and cost models presented in this paper, three
separate scenarios for the growth of SOC operating revenues are
considered. On the high side, SOC profits begin at $1 billion
per year and grow at the rate of $100 million per year. On the
low side, the SOC starts off by losing $200 million per year, and
improves at the rate of $50 million per year. In the median
case, the SOC grows at a rate of $75 million per year following
initial annual earnings of $400 million per year. The discounted
present-value of the SOC enterprise, evaluated in the initial
year, is measured on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis
represents the duration of the investment horizon. If the median
growth rate for SOC earnings were achieved, for example, then the
estimated present-value of the first ten years of the enterprise
would be about -$1.6 billion. With the investment horizon
extended to fifteen years (thrG ugh the year 2000, in this
example) , the present-value would be approximately -$0.25
-18-
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billion. In this assessment the present-value of the SOC ranges
from a loss of $3.3 billion to a gain of $2.9 billion. it should
be noted that with an assumed lot real discount rate, a
significaW, risk expectation has been included in the analysis.
The paybac:. period in this worst case ranges from ten to twenty
years.
Figure 4 shows a present-value analysis based on a set of
more optimistic (and probably more likely) conditions. In this
case it is assumed that through some type of joint private-public
endeavor, the private investment is limited to the $1.1 billion
SOC production cost, and that SOC operations begin after a
three-year investment period. The most likely means of achieving
a SOC through this level of private financing would be for NASA
or the DOD to fund SOC research and development, and for the
,rivate sector to become involved at the conclusion of such
efforts, financing only the actual construction of the facility.
There are, however, other possible means of reducing private
outlays to the $1 billion-range, including the earlier-mentioned
options of tax credits and cost-saving design modifications.
This "best-case" present-value scenario also assumes a real
discount rate of 7%. The growth of SOC earnings is considered in
the same three cases as the "worst-case" present-value analysis.
The results of the best-case present-value analysis are
striking. present-value ranges as high as $8.6 billion, with
payback periods as short as 5 years. Even the low-growth
scenario results in a positive present-value if the investment
horizon is extended slightly beyond the year 2000, and the median
case yields a present-value of nearly $4 billion. Why then, are
private companies not stampeding to work with the government to
develop a privately-operated multi-purpose Space Operations
Center? There are three major reasons. First, these cost and
revenue projections are all very "soft" and will require large
expenditures of resources for confirmation. Second, the
companies most qualified to undertake such a venture (such as
aerospace and defense firms) have a vested interest in working
through more traditional channels, and the concept of a
privately-financed SOC will take some time to gain acceptance in
the industry. Finally, companies (and non-aerospace firms in
particular) tend to view all space projects as enormous,
long-term, high risk investments, and if the SOC is an exception
to this rule (which it may or may not be) it can be proven only
at considerable expense.
The Space Operations Center is an exciting concept whose time
may be coming. It may happen within this century, or it may take
awhile longer to develop. While there is a broad spectrum of
financing alternatives which might be applicable to the
development of such a facility, the figures in this paper
demonstrate that there is a chance that a SOC could be developed
privately or semi-privately at a considerable profit, with the
potential for particularly impressive long-term finapcial
returns. Although this study is not in itself justification for
such a venture, it does, in the author's opinion, present a set
of fascinating business opportunities which merit careful
consideration.
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Appendix A -- Decision Trees
The present value assessments performed in section VII
considered only two of many possible financing alternatives for
development of the S;-, ,ace Operations Center. SOC financing
options can also be viewed in the context of a decision tree,
which goes a step beyond calculation of discount rates in the
evaluation of project risk. In the decision tree in Figure 5,
the branches 1 through n emanating from the decision node D
represent distinct SOC financing alternatives, and are hence
"decision variables." Decision branch 1, for example, could
represent a case in which the SOC is financed solely by private
funds, which would be partially analagous to the "worst-case"
present-value scenario in section VIi (Figure 3). Decision n, at
the other extreme, might represent a cave in which the SOC is
financed in full by the government.
Each financing alternative has associated with it a range of
possible outcomes with regard to SOC value and earnings.
included among the outcomes for decision 1 might be the high,
median, and low SOC earnings outcomes associated with the
worst-case SOC financing scenario. In the SOC present-value
analysis in this paper these outcomes were treated as discrete
(distinct) growth rates for SOC earnings, each representing a
particular present-values The present.-value associated with
branch lb in Figure 5, for example, would be the median growth
scenario for the worst-case financing alternative, or -$0.2
billion.
A vigorous comparative study of the values of various SOC
financing options would have to attach many more than three
possible value outcomes to each SOC financing alternative. In
fact, discrete value outcomes might be discarded in favor of
"continuous" distributions on earnings. For (undefined)
financing alternative 2, for instance, present-value could
perhaps range from -$2 billion to $2 billion, with an infinite
number of possible value outcomes in between. To calculate the
probability of attaining any particular present-value within this
range would require knowledge of the "probability distribution"
over SOC earnings for that financing option. A more thorough
study of SOC financing alternatives would also have to better
define SOC "present-value" and "earnings." In this paper, the
value of the SOC was viewed primarily from the perspective of a
private company engaged in a SOC enterprise, hence present-value
was calculated in terms of dollar profit and was of course higher
for the case in which much of the SOC financing was undertaken byi	
the government. If instead total "social" costs and benefits
were taken into account, the differences between the "best-" and
"worst-case" present-value scenarios might not have been as
great.
The final goal of tLle decision-tree analysis woUJd be to
associate with each SOC financing alternative a range of possible
value outcomes and a probability distribution over each range.
This would permit the calulation of the "expected value" of each
-22-
financing alternative, and the option with the greatest expected
value could then be selected. As was just mentioned, however,
judgment of the relative merits of each financing alternative
would depend greatly on how SOC "value" is defined to begin with.
I	 1	 t	 t	 1
FIGURE 5
A Decision Tree for Various SOC Financing Alternatives
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Appendix B - SOC Military Operations
In discussing SOC military operations, it is not the author's
Intent to advocate the militarization of space. The major
purpose of this paper, in fact, is to explore possibilities for
the rapid growth of peaceful applications of space technology.
it should be recognized, however, that military uses of space can
and have aided world stability by providing reliable
communications systems, verification of compliance with arms
control treaties, and the security which comes with knowing what
other nations are doing militarily. it is hoped that it is these
military operations which will be continued, rather than the
development of space weapons systems which could undermine
international stability and the balance of power. in order to
prevent the latter possibility from becoming reality, it is the
author's opinion that terrestrial and space arms control
negotiations should be pursued vigorously, and that all civilian
and military uses of the SOC and other space facilities should be
carefully designed to enhance, rather than to weaken, the cause
of world peace.
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